BRINGING MERCENARIES TO JUSTICE: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS, CHALLENGES, AND CASE STUDIES IN ADDRESSING MERCENARISM IN FOREIGN ARMED CONFLICTS

Аннотация

Mercenarism, the act of engaging in armed conflict for private gain, presents unique legal challenges in the pursuit of justice. This article explores the international and national legal frameworks governing mercenarism, the specific obstacles to prosecuting mercenaries for actions in foreign conflicts, and real-world cases that illustrate accountability efforts. Drawing on treaties, conventions, national laws, and documented prosecutions, it highlights the complexities of jurisdiction, evidence collection, and political dynamics. Case studies, including the Luanda Trial of 1976, the 2004 Equatorial Guinea coup attempt, and the Wagner Group’s contemporary operations, underscore both progress and persistent gaps. The analysis concludes with recommendations to strengthen enforcement mechanisms. Key words: mercenarism, PMSC, International armed conflict, trial, International Humanitarian Law, The Wagner Group. ПРИВЛЕЧЕНИЕ НАЕМНИКОВ К ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ: ПРАВОВЫЕ ОСНОВЫ, ПРОБЛЕМЫ И ПРИМЕРЫ БОРЬБЫ С НАЕМНИЧЕСТВОМ В ВООРУЖЕННЫХ КОНФЛИКТАХ ЗА РУБЕЖОМ Аннотация. Наемничество, акт участия в вооруженном конфликте ради личной выгоды, представляет собой уникальные правовые проблемы в стремлении к правосудию. В этой статье рассматриваются международные и национальные правовые рамки, регулирующие наемничество, конкретные препятствия для судебного преследования наемников за действия в иностранных конфликтах и реальные случаи, которые иллюстрируют усилия по привлечению к ответственности. Опираясь на договоры, конвенции, национальные законы и задокументированные судебные преследования, она подчеркивает сложность юрисдикции, сбора доказательств и политической динамики. Исследования случаев, включая Луандийский процесс 1976 года, попытку переворота в Экваториальной Гвинее 2004 года и современные операции группы Вагнера, подчеркивают как прогресс, так и сохраняющиеся пробелы. Анализ завершается рекомендациями по укреплению механизмов обеспечения соблюдения. Ключевые слова: наемничество, ЧВК, международный вооруженный конфликт, судебный процесс, международное гуманитарное право, группа Вагнера. 867 ResearchBib IF - 11.01, ISSN: 3030-3753, Volume 2 Issue 4 Introduction. Mercenarism has a long history, evolving from medieval hired soldiers to modern private military entities operating across borders. International law defines a mercenary as an individual recruited specifically to fight in an armed conflict, motivated primarily by private gain, and unaffiliated with the official armed forces of a state involved in the conflict.1 The resurgence of mercenary activities in conflicts such as those in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya has amplified the urgency of addressing their legal accountability.2 This article examines the legal frameworks that regulate mercenarism, the challenges in prosecuting mercenaries for participation in foreign armed conflicts, and notable cases that demonstrate the application of these laws. It aims to provide a rigorous analysis grounded in reliable sources, balancing theoretical frameworks with practical examples. Legal Frameworks Governing Mercenarism The prosecution of mercenaries relies on a patchwork of international, regional, and national legal instruments. These frameworks define mercenarism, establish obligations for states, and outline accountability mechanisms. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) International humanitarian law provides the foundational legal definition of mercenarism through Article 47 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977. This article identifies a mercenary based on six cumulative conditions: 1. Recruitment specifically for participation in a particular armed conflict. 2. Direct engagement in hostilities. 3. Primary motivation of private gain, with compensation substantially higher than that paid to regular combatants. 4. Neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of its territory. 5. Not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict. 6. Not deployed by a state on official military duties.3 Individuals meeting these criteria are excluded from combatant or prisoner-of-war status, rendering them liable to prosecution as civilians involved in hostilities.4 However, Protocol I does not explicitly criminalize mercenarism, leaving enforcement to other legal regimes. International Conventions The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, adopted by the United Nations in 1989 and entering into force in 2001, offers a 1 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Art. 47. 2 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Libya, UN Doc. S/2020/832 (2020). 3 Protocol I, Art. 47(2). 4 Henckaerts, J.-M., & Doswald-Beck, L., Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 868 ResearchBib IF - 11.01, ISSN: 3030-375