Конституционные элементы независимости судебной власти: достаточно ли их в Конституции Узбекистана?

Аннотация

Ключевые слова: В данной статье утверждается, что в Конституции Судебная власть, Республики Узбекистан недостаточно конституционных судьи, элементов судебной независимости. В статье суды, анализируются нормы Конституции США касающиеся независимость судебной власти, обеспечения независимости судебной власти. На основе срок полномочий судей, проведенного анализа в статье делается вывод о том, что назначение судей, де-юре независимость судебной власти так же важна, как и заработная плата судей. де-факто независимость судебной власти, и Узбекистану следует усовершенствовать свою Конституцию, чтобы в ней было больше стандартных конституционных элементов, направленных на обеспечение независимости судебной власти. The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan ensures judicial independence with its declarative rules, which say, “The judicial authority in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall function independently from the legislative and executive authorities, political parties, other public associations” [1] and “Judges shall be independent and subject solely to law. Any interference in the work of judges in administering law shall be inadmissible and punishable by law” [2]. Today, 77 percent of the world constitutions have declarative rules stating that the judiciary is an independent branch of government [3]. Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan has also some specific rules on ensuring judicial independence and they concern separation of powers [4], judicial appointment [5], prohibition of judges being members of political parties, participating in political movements [6]. In addition, the Constitution provides that “the immunity of judges shall be guaranteed by law” [7] and “Before the completion of his term of office, a judge may be relieved of his post only on grounds specified by law” [8]. The rules do not establish concrete rules for ensuring the immunity of judges and constitutional grounds for removing judges from office. The challenge is that declarative rules on judicial independence in Constitution of Uzbekistan are not enough to ensure judicial independence as they just declare that judiciary is independent and they do not frame the mechanism for ensuring judicial independence. As for the existent specific rules, judicial appointment rules only concern the judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Disputes on separation of powers are not heard by any courts as none of them has such a jurisdiction. We argue that Constitution of Uzbekistan should have more specific rules on ensuring judicial independence. As J. Melton and T. Ginsberg assert, declarative rules on the independence of the judiciary cannot fully ensure the independence of the judiciary. Because declarative rules cannot prevent judges from retaliation towards judges due to their decisions, which are unpleasant to government authorities. They turn the independence of judiciary into an abstract concept. Therefore, the constitution should include special guarantees – institutional protections aimed at ensuring the independence of the judiciary [9]. 206 Жамият ва инновациялар – Общество и инновации – Society and innovations Special Issue – 10 (2022) / ISSN 2181-1415 J. Melton and T. Ginsberg state that constitutions should reflect the following measures to ensure judicial independence: 1) statement of judicial independence; 2) judicial tenure; 3) selection procedure; 4) removal procedure; 5) limited removal conditions; 6) salary insulation [10]. The Constitution of the United States followed the same way with exception of declaring the judiciary independent with a declarative rule. Judicial independence is more referred to in the Federalist papers, which can be widely used to interpret this notion in research and cases. Specific rules on ensuring judicial independence can be found in different parts of the United States Constitution. Article II Section 2 of the United States Constitution endows the power of appointing federal judges to the President of the USA, stating: “he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law...” This constitutional appointment clause specifies by whom federal justices are nominated, confirmed, appointed. In this clause four sequential acts are contemplated for appointment of judges as follows: 1) getting advice by the President on judicial nominee from the Senate; 2) submitting a judicial nominee by the President to the Senate; 3) giving consent to judicial nominee by the Senate; 4) appointing the consented nominee to the judicial position by the President. The consent of the Senate to the judicial nominee is advisory and this consent does not make the President bound to the appointment or does not authorize the confirmed candidate. The Senate is empowered to confirm or reject a nominee [11]