PARTY AUTONOMY AND JURISDICTION IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

Аннотация

This article explores the scope and limitations of party autonomy in investment disputes through the lens of private international law (PIL). It offers a comparative analysis of the European Union and the Republic of Uzbekistan, examining how each jurisdiction conceptualizes international jurisdiction in investor–State arbitration. While the EU has increasingly restricted arbitral autonomy through the Achmea and Komstroy rulings, Uzbekistan maintains a more liberal and investor-friendly approach. The article evaluates the legal, institutional, and policy implications of these divergent models, proposing a balanced framework that reconciles investor expectations with national legal sovereignty under PIL principles. Keywords: Party Autonomy, investment arbitration, private international law, jurisdiction, European Union, Uzbekistan, Achmea, Enforcement ofAwards, Forum selection. The evolution of transnational investment law has placed increasing pressure on traditional jurisdictional concepts rooted in private international law (PIL). At the heart of this tension lies the principle of party autonomy, which under PIL allows parties to select the competent forum for resolving disputes. While this principle is a cornerstone of commercial arbitration, its application in the contextof investment disputes governed by a network ofbilateral and multilateral treaties is far from straightforward. In the European Union, recent jurisprudence has significantly curtailed party autonomy in investment arbitration, particularly through the landmark Achmea and Komstroy decisions, which declared intra-EU investor–State arbitration incompatible with EU law. By contrast, the Republic of Uzbekistan continues to expand and rely on broad jurisdictional clauses in its BITs, offering foreign investors flexiblepathways to arbitration. However, this openness is tempered by alack of clear domesticPIL doctrine and inconsistent judicial practices. This article undertakes a comparative analysis of the treatment of party autonomy in investment disputes in the EU and Uzbekistan. It examines how international jurisdiction is conceptualized and constrained within each legal system and what implications this holds for legal certainty, investorconfidence, and systemic coherence. 1.Theoretical Background: Investment Arbitration in thePIL Framework Investment arbitration operates at the intersection of public and private law. While investment treaties (such as BITs or multilateral agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty) are instruments of public international law, they create rights that are invoked by private actors—investors— against sovereign states. The procedural vehicle for enforcing these rights often resembles private arbitration. Private international law becomes relevant in several ways: first, through determining the applicable procedural law (lex arbitri), second, in recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards, and third,in defining the scopeofparty autonomy in jurisdictionalmatters. 313 INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL FOR RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SJIF2019:5.2222020:5.5522021:5.6372022:5.4792023:6.5632024:7,805 eISSN:2394-6334 https://www.ijmrd.in/index.php/imjrd Volume12,issue06(2025) In theory, party autonomy enables parties to choose between domestic courts and arbitration, designate arbitral institutions or ad hoc mechanisms, and select seats of arbitration. However, in practice, this autonomy is subject tomandatory rules, publicpolicy exceptions (order public), and, increasingly, political considerations. 2.Party Autonomy and Jurisdiction in theEU: Post-Achmea Constraints The EU's legal system presents a unique supranational dimension that heavily influences jurisdictional doctrine. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV (Case C-284/16) held that arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs are incompatible with the autonomy of EU law. This position was reinforced in Komstroy v. Moldova (Case C-741/19), where theCJEUextended theprohibition tointra-EU disputes under theEnergy Charter Treaty. The rationale behind these decisions lies in the EU’s insistence on the exclusive jurisdiction of its judicial system to interpret and apply EU law. Investment arbitration, viewed as an external mechanism, is seen as a threat to this legal autonomy. As a result, party autonomy is significantly restricted: even if two parties wish to arbitrate under a treaty, the EU legal framework may override theirconsent. These developments have created legal uncertainty for investors and Member States alike. While arbitral tribunals may continue to accept jurisdiction, national courts in the EU are increasingly refusing to enforce awards rendered under intra-EU BITs. This raises profound questions about thefuture roleof PIL ininvestment disputes within theEU. 3.TheUzbekApproach: ExpansiveAutonomy AmidInstitutional Weakness Uzbekistan offers a stark contrast. As a country undergoing legal and economic transform